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of Civil Procedure Article 19153 regarding partial judgment. One change in
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1. Act 483 became effective when approved by the Governor on July 1, 1997.
2. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966:
A. (1) The plaintiff or defendant in the principal or any incidental action, with or
without supporting affidavits, may move for a summary judgment in his favor for all or
part of the relief for which he has prayed. The plaintiff's motion may be made at any
time after the answer has been filed. The defendant's motion may be made at any time.
(2) The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action, except those disallowed by Article 969. The
procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends.
B. The motion for summary judgment and supporting affidavits shall be served at least
ten days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing
affidavits prior to the date of the hearing. The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact,
and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
C. (1) After adequate discovery or after a case is set for trial, a motion which shows
that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law shall be granted.
(2) The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the movant will not
bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for
summary judgment, the movant's burden on the motion does not require him to negate
all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point
out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements
essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party
fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his
evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact.
D. The court shall hear and render judgment on the motion for summary judgment
within a reasonable time, but in any event judgment on the motion shall be rendered at
least ten days prior to trial.
E. A summary judgment may be rendered dispositive of a particular issue, theory of
recovery, cause of action, or defense, in favor of one or more parties, even though the
granting of the summary judgment does not dispose of the entire case.
3. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915:
A. A final judgment may be rendered and signed by the court, even though it may not
grant the successful party or parties all of the relief prayed for, or may not adjudicate all
of the issues in the case, when the court:
(1) Dismisses the suit as to less than all of the parties, defendants, third party plaintiffs,
third party defendants, or intervenors.
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Article 966 attempts to clarify 1996 legislation whose purpose had been to bring
Louisiana summary judgment procedure more closely in line with federal
summary judgment procedure.4 Because our case law developed divergent views
on how much the 1996 legislation had changed our procedure,5 Act 483
legislatively overruled all cases inconsistent with Hayes v. Autin--the case our
legislature chose as expressing the correct view. Another change in Article 966
appears to have greatly broadened the scope of summary judgment to include a
disposition of a particular issue, theory of recovery, cause of action, or defense,
even when the summary judgment grants no "relief' as that term has been
understood in our jurisprudence.7
Furthermore, Act 483's rewriting of Article 1915 effected a very different
approach to determining the finality and immediate appealability of. partial
judgments. Unlike the former approach under which Article 1915's exclusive list
of permissible partial final judgments controlled these matters, the new approach
is patterned after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)8 under which the trial
(2) Grants a motion for judgment on the pleadings, as provided by Articles 965, 968,
and 969.
(3) Grants a motion for summary judgment as provided by Articles 966 through 969,
including a summary judgment granted pursuant to Article 966(E).
(4) Signs a judgment on either the principal or incidental demand, when the two have
been tried separately, as provided by Article 1038.
(5) Signs a judgment on the issue of liability when that issue has been tried separately
by the court, or when, in a jury trial, the issue of liability has been tried before a jury and
the issue of damages is to be tried before a different jury.
B. (1) When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment or
sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands,
issues, theories, or parties, whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-
claim, third party claim, or intervention, the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment
unless specifically agreed to by the parties or unless designated as a final judgment by the
court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.
(2) In the absence of such a determination and designation, any order or decision which
adjudicates fewer than all claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties,
shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties and shall not constitute a
final judgment for the purpose of an immediate appeal. Any such order or decision issued
may be revised at any time prior to rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
C. If an appeal is taken from any judgment rendered under the provisions of this
Article, the trial court shall retain jurisdiction to adjudicate the remaining issues in the
case.
4. See infra text under subheading Platitudes and Attitudes.
5. See Stephen Anthony Pitre, Comment, The Pelican State Amends Summary Judgment:
Recent Louisiana Jurisprudence Uncertain About Legislative Intent, 43 Loy. L Rev. 97 (1997);
David W. Robertson, Summary Judgment and Burden of Proof, 45 La. B.J. 331 (1997).
6. 685 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996), writ denied, 690 So. 2d 41 (1997).
7. See infra text under subheading Confusion on Partial Summary Judgments.
8. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b):
Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When more than one
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim,
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court's discretion essentially governs the finality and immediate appealability of
partial adjudications.'
Both Article 966 and Article 1915 now borrow heavily from the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, but neither article has fully adopted the corresponding
federal provisions. As a result, the current state of our law poses important and
importunate procedural problems that need both judicial and legislative solutions.
In this article we will examine the current state of Louisiana law in the key
procedural areas of summary judgment and partial judgment, indicate matters
needing clarification and revision, and propose possible solutions.
We will begin our examination of summary judgment by making side-by-
side comparisons of corresponding state and federal provisions on summary
judgment procedure, and by reviewing their legislative histories in order to: (1)
demonstrate that the core procedures for seeking and opposing summary
judgment always have been virtually the same under both Louisiana and federal
law; and (2) set the stage for questioning the correctness of views expressed in
Hayes v. Autin concerning the effect of legislative changes to Article 966.1" We
next will examine the 1996 and 1997 amendments to Article 966 in light of state
and federal jurisprudence in order to develop our thesis that the changes in
Article 966 should not be viewed as changes in Louisiana's summary judgment
standard, but should result in significant changes inside Louisiana's courtrooms
by prompting a better understanding of basic principles underlying summary
judgment procedure.1 '
We will begin our examination of partial judgment by investigating
discrepancies between state and federal law that have created confusion
concerning the triggering of appellate delays, 2 the certification of a partial
adjudication for immediate appeal, 3 and the scope of a partial summary
judgment. 4 We conclude by suggesting specific language changes in the Code
of Civil Procedure to eliminate this confusion.' s
or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon
an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry ofjudgment. In the absence of such determination and direction,
any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate
the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is
subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
9. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
10. See infra text under subheading Comparing State and Federal Procedures.
11. See infra text under subheading Platitudes and Attitudes.
12. See infra text under subheading Confusion on Appellate Delays.
13. See infra text under subheading Confusion on Certification.
14. See infra text under subheading Confusion on Partial Summary Judgments.
15. See Infra text under heading CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS.
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I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT: A STATE OF REEXAMINATION
A. Comparing State and Federal Procedures
Under both Louisiana and federal law, the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact always has been the sine qua non for summary judgment.' 6
Furthermore, both Louisiana and federal law have the same core procedures for
seeking and opposing summary judgment. Corresponding provisions include the
following:
Louisiana Provisions
The plaintiff or defendant in
the principal or incidental action,
with or without supporting affida-
vits, may move for a summary
judgment in his favor for all or part
of the relief for which he has
prayed. The plaintiff's motion may
be made at any time after the an-
swer has been filed. The defend-
ant's motion may be made at any
time. Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 966(A)(1).
Federal Provisions
A party seeking to recover
upon a claim, counter claim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declara-
tory judgment may, at any time
after the expiration of 20 days from
the commencement of the action or
after service of a motion for sum-
mary judgment by the adverse par-
ty, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment
in the party's favor upon all or any
part thereof. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(a).
A party against whom a claim,
counter claim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment
is sought may, at any time, move
with or without supporting affida-
vits for summary judgment in the
party's favor as to all or any part
thereof. Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 56(b).
16. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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The motion for summary judg-
ment and supporting affidavits shall
be served at least ten days before
the time specified for the hearing.
The adverse party may serve op-
posing affidavits prior to the date of
the hearing. The judgment sought
shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to material fact, and that
mover is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 966(B).
Supporting and opposing affi-
davits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts
as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to
the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or
parts thereof referred to in an affi-
davit shall be attached thereto or
served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers
to interrogatories, or by further
affidavits.
When a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported as
provided above, an adverse party
may not rest on the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as other-
wise provided above, must set
The motion shall be served at
least ten days before the time fixed
for the hearing. The adverse party
prior to the day of hearing may
serve opposing affidavits. The
judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. A summary judg-
ment, interlocutory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of
damages. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(c).
Supporting and opposing affi-
davits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts
as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to
the matters stated therein. Sworn
or certified copies of all papers or
parts thereof referred to in an affi-
davit shall be attached thereto or
served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplement-
ed or opposed by depositions, an-
swers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule,
an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of
the adverse party's
pleading, but the adverse party's
response, by affidavits or as other-
1998]
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forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If
he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be
rendered against him.
If it appears from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that
for reasons stated he cannot present
by affidavit facts essential to justify
his opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affi-
davits to be obtained or depositions
to be taken or discovery to be had
or may make such other order as is
just.
If it appears to the satisfaction
of the court at any time that any of
the affidavits presented pursuant to
this article are presented in bad
faith or solely for the purposes of
delay, the court immediately shall
order the party employing them to
pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the
filing of the affidavits caused him
to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees. Any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of
contempt. Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 967.
wise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If
the adverse party does not so re-
spond, summary judgment, if ap-
propriate, shall be entered against
the adverse party. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(e).
Should it appear from the affi-
davits of a party opposing the mo-
tion that the party cannot for rea-
sons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the party's oppo-
sition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affi-
davits to be obtained or depositions
to be taken or discovery to be had
or may make such other order as is
just. Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 56(t).
Should it appear to the satis-
faction of the court at any time that
any of the affidavits presented pur-
suant to this rule are presented in
bad faith or solely for the purpose
of delay, the court shall forthwith
order the party employing them to
pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the
filing of the affidavits caused the
other party to incur, including rea-
sonable attorney's fees, and any
offending party or attorney maybe
adjudged guilty of contempt. Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g)
When Louisiana adopted the Code of Civil Procedure in 1960," the
provisions of Article 967 were substantially the same as Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(e)-(g). Likewise, the provisions of Article 966 were based upon
17. See 1960 La. Acts 15.
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Rule 56(a)-(c) with two minor differences: first, the Louisiana provisions
permitted a party to move for summary judgment at a slightly different point in
an action; second, the Louisiana provisions did not permit interlocutory summary
judgments on the issue of liability.
Congress amended Rule 56 in 1963 to add "answers to interrogatories" to
the materials that a court may consider on a motion for summary judgment, and
to add the final two sentences of subdivision (e) that deal with an adverse party's
response to a summary judgment motion." In turn, the 1966 amendments to
Articles 966 and 967 incorporated these changes into Louisiana law. '9 Congress
made only technical amendments to Rule 56 after 1963.20 Similarly, the
Louisiana legislature made no changes to Article 967 after 1966, and made only
two related and relatively minor adjustments to Article 966 prior to 1996. One
was the 1983 adoption of the federal provisions allowing a summary judgment,
"interlocutory in character," on the issue of liability alone;2 the other was the
1984 deletion of the words "interlocutory in character," making such a partial
summary judgment into a partial final judgment."
Prior to 1996, the one notable difference between Rule 56 and Articles 966
and 967 concerned cases not fully adjudicated on a motion for summary
judgment. In such cases Rule 56(d)23 requires a federal court, if practicable, to
ascertain the material facts that are and are not controverted, and then to make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy. At trial,
facts specified in the order are deemed established, and the trial is conducted
accordingly. The more accurate term for such an order is "interlocutory
adjudication," rather than "partial summary judgment." Rule 56, standing alone,
is intended neither to affect appellate jurisdiction, nor to make any interlocutory
order appealable.24 The primary purpose of a Rule 56(d) order is to salvage all
constructive results from a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, even
18. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes (1963).
19. See 1966 La. Acts 36, § 1.
20. See Fed. K. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes (1987).
21. See 1983 La. Acts 101, § 1.
22. See 1984 La. Acts 89, § 1.
23. Fed. I Civ. P. 56(d):
Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted.
It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not
in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the
trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be
conducted accordingly.
24. See 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Manual: Federal Practice and Procedure §
17.1411] (1998).
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though the motion is denied or only partially granted.25 Because such a pretrial
order is interlocutory, it is subject to revision or vacation.26
The only Louisiana procedure somewhat similar to Rule 56(d) is found in
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 155127 under which a state district
court at a pretrial conferencecan direct counsel to consider what material facts and
issues exist without substantial controversy, and can render an order reciting the
agreements made by the parties and limiting the issues for trial to those not
disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel. Like an order under Rule
56(d), a pretrial order under Article 155 1, unless modified, controls the subsequent
course of the action. Nevertheless, the state and federal provisions concerning
pretrial orders do not alterprocedures for seeking or opposing summay judgment.
In 1996 the legislature made language changes in Article 966 that were
acclaimed in Hayes v. Autin as substantially changing the law of summary
judgment, "leveling the playing field" between the moving and the opposing
parties, and bringing Louisiana's standard for summary judgment closely in line
with the federal courts' "more liberal standard" under Rule 56(c). 28 The
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1551:
A. In any civil action in a district court the court may in its discretion direct the
attorneys for the parties to appear before it for conferences to consider any of the
following:
(i) The simplification of the issues, including the elimination of frivolous claims or
defenses.
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings.
(3) What material facts and issues exist without substantial controversy, and what
material facts and issues are actually and in good faith controverted.
(4) Proof, stipulations regarding the authenticity of documents, and advance rulings
from the court on the admissibility of evidence.
(5) Limitations or restrictions on or regulation of the use of expert testimony under
Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 702.
(6) The control and scheduling of discovery.
(7) The identification of witnesses, documents, and exhibits.
(8) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
B. The court shall render an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any
of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by
admissions or agreements of counsel. Such order controls the subsequent course of the
action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice.
C. If a party's attorney fails to obey a pretrial order, or to appear at the pretrial and
scheduling conference, or is substantially unprepared to participate in the conference or
fails to participate in good faith, the court, on its own motion or on the motion of a party,
after hearing, may make such orders as are just, including orders provided in Article 1471
(2), (3) and (4). In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the court may require the
party or the attorney representing the party or both to pay the reasonable expenses
incurred by noncompliance with this Paragraph, including attorney fees.
28. Hayes v. Autin, 685 So. 2d 691, 694-95 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996), writ denied, 690 So. 2d
41 (1997).
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legislature designed Act 483 of 1997 to clarify the 1996 changes and to overrule
all cases inconsistent with Hayes.29 Yet, the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact continues to be the ultimate standard for granting summary
judgment under both Louisiana and federal law, and the core procedures for
seeking and opposing summary judgment also continue to be virtually the same
under both. Thus, questions linger as to the correctness of the amendments'
underlying premise-that Louisiana and federal courts have applied different
standards for summary judgment. We now will examine the 1996 and 1997
language changes and the state and federal jurisprudence concerning standards
for summary judgment.
B. Platitudes and Attitudes
The 1996 amendments to Article 966 added four new paragraphs:3"
The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, except those
disallowed by Article 969. The procedure is favored and shall be
construed to accomplish these ends.'
After adequate discovery or after a case is set for trial, a motion
which shows that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that
mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law shall be granted against
an adverse party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
proof of an element essential to his claim, action, or defense and on
which he will bear the burden of proof at trial.32
The court shall hear and render judgment on the motion for
summary judgment within a reasonable time, but in any event judgment
on the motion shall be rendered at least ten days prior to trial.33
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Article to the contrary,
the burden of proof shall remain with the mover.34
The primary source of this new language was the United States Supreme
Court case of Celotex Corporation v. Catrett.35 The case is an excellent primer
on summary judgment when the five-justice majority opinion is read together
with the three-justice dissenting opinion. While disagreeing with the majority
on application of summary judgment principles to the case's unique facts, the
cogent dissent is fully consistent with the majority's legal analysis concerning
29. See 1997 La. Acts 483, § 4.
30. See First Extraordinary Session of 1996 La. Acts 9, § 1.
31. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(2).
32. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(C).
33. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D).
34. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(G).
35. 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. CL 2548 (1986).
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summary judgment, and the case as a whole is very helpful in analyzing
Louisiana's summary judgment law.
Celotex was a wrongful death action in which Catrett alleged her husband's
death was due to exposure to asbestos products manufactured or distributed by
defendants. The District Court granted a Celotex motion for summary judgment
because Catrett was unable to produce evidence of exposure to Celotex asbestos
products. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Celotex failed
to support its summary judgment motion with evidence tending to negate such
exposure. 6 The appellate court referred to language in Rule 56(e) stating that
when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in the
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his
pleadings; the court also referred to language in the Advisory Committee Note
to Rule 56 stating that where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does
not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied
even if no opposing evidence is presented. Additionally, the court cited the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.37 as
holding not only that the moving party has the burden of initially showing the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, but also that the opposing party
"bears the burden of responding only after the moving party has met its burden
of coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issues of material
fact. 38 Thus, the appellate court essentially concluded that proper support for
a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 must include a positive
evidentiary showing. Eight of nine Supreme Court justices expressly disagreed
with this conclusion; one voted to affirm on other grounds.
The Supreme Court majority opinion found the Court of Appeals' position
to be inconsistent with the standard for summary judgment set forth in Rule
56(c):
In our view the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.39
The obvious source of paragraph (C) and the apparent source of paragraph (G)
of the 1996 amendments to Article 96640 are, respectively, the Celotex language
quoted above and Celotex discussion of the burden of proof discussed below.
The Celotex majority agreed with Adickes in placing the burden on the
moving party to show initially the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
36. See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Corp., 756 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
37. 398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct 1598 (1970).
38. Catrett, 756 F.2d at 184.
39. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. CL at 2552.
40. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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However, the majority did not think, as had the Court of Appeals, that Adickes
placed a burden on the moving party to produce evidence showing the absence
of genuine issue of material fact, even for an issue on which the nonmoving
party bears the burden of proof at trial. Instead, the moving party could
discharge its burden by "showing" the district court the absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's claim. The Court found no express or implied
requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion "with affidavits
or other similar materials" negating the opponent's claims:
On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to "the affidavits, if any,"
suggests the absence of such a requirement. And if there were any
doubt about the meaning of Rule 56(c) in this regard, such doubt is
clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide that claimants
and defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment "with
or without supporting affidavits." The import of these subsections is
that, regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary
judgment motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be
granted so long as whateveris before the district court demonstrates that
the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule
56(c), is satisfied.4'
As previously noted, the three-justicd dissenting opinion is fully consistent
with the five-justice majority opinion regarding summary judgment principles;
moreover, the dissent more clearly explains the moving party's burden where the
nonmoving party cannot prove its case. The dissent explains that the burden of
establishing the non-existence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the
moving party and has two distinct components: (1) an initial burden of
production; and (2) an ultimate burden of persuasion. While the initial burden
of production, if satisfied by the moving party, can be shifted to the nonmoving
party, the burden of persuasion always remains on the moving party. (Note the
close match with the language of Article 966(G) of the 1996 amendments.)
Unless the court finds the moving party has met its initial burden of production,
the court need not decide whether the moving party has met the ultimate burden
of persuasion.4 '
The dissent further explains that the burden of production requires the
moving party to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary
judgment, and that the manner in which this showing can be made depends upon
which party will bear the burden of persuasion on the challenged claim at trial.
If the moving party will bear the burden of persuasion, the moving party must
support its motion with credible evidence consisting of any of the items specified
in Rule 56(c). If this evidence would entitle the moving party to a directed
41. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986) (emphasis
added).
42. Id. at 330-31, 106 S. Ct. at 2556.
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verdict if not controverted at trial, then the burden of production shifts to the
nonmoving party either to produce evidence showing that a genuine issue of
material fact exists, or to submit an affidavit requesting more discovery time.
On the other hand, if the nonmoving party will bear the burden of persuasion at
trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of production in two ways: (1)
submit affirmative evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim; or (2) demonstrate to the court the insufficiency of the
nonmoving party's evidence on an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim. 3
Significantly, the dissent clearly points out that in the latter instance:
[A] conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence
is insufficient. Such a burden of production is no burden at all and
would simply permit summary judgment procedure to be converted into
a tool for harassment."
Instead, the moving party must affirmatively demonstrate the absence of
sufficient evidence, and this may require the moving party to depose the
nonmoving party's witnesses or to establish the inadequacy of documenta-
tion. The moving party may demonstrate the literal absence of evidence
in the record "by reviewing for the court the admissions, interrogatories,
and other exchanges between the parties that are in the record."'"
The preceding discussion of Celotex reveals the source and presumably
reveals the intent of paragraphs (C) and (G) of the 1996 amendments to Article
966. The source of paragraph (A)(2)46 also may be found in the Celotex
majority opinion:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have for almost 50 years
authorized motions for summary judgment upon proper showings of the
lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact. Summary judgment
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut,
but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action."47
While Article 966(A)(2) provides that Louisiana summary judgment
procedure is favored, whereas the above-quoted Celotex language provides that
federal summary judgment procedure is not disfavored, our legislature arguably
intended for summary judgment procedure in Louisiana to have the same status
43. Id. at 331, 106 S. Ct. at 2557.
44. Id. at 332, 106 S. CL at 2557 (empasis added).
45. Id., 106 S. Ct. at 2557.
46. See supra text accompanying note 30.
47. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S. CL at 2555.
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as under federal law. Thus, the pre-Celotex Louisiana case of Butler v. K-Mart
Corporation48 seems to capture the intent of Article 966(A)(2) in these words:
Summary judgment can avoid delay and expense for both
litigants and the court if it is appropriate. If the procedure is to
have meaning, it must be applied in cases .. where it is
obviously warranted.49
An important point here is that in both Article 966(A)(2) and Celotex,
summary judgment procedure is lauded-not the granting of summary
judgment.
Act 483 of 1997 condensed and reworded paragraphs (C) and (G) of the
1996 amendments into a single new paragraph (C) that provides:
(1) After adequate discovery or after a case is set for trial, a motion
which shows that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that
mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law shall be granted.
(2) The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the
movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is
before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant's
burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential
elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to
point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one
or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim,, action, or
defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support
sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentia-
ry burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material
fact.5 °
Plainly, Celotex is the source of this new language, just as Celotex was the
source of the 1996 amendments. Therefore, the new language strongly suggests
an intention to clarify rather than change the law, and this intent is confirmed by
Section 4 of Act 483:
The purpose of Sections 1 and 3 of this Act is to clarify Acts 1996,
No. 9, § 1 of the First Extraordinary Session of 1996 and to legislative-
ly overrule all cases inconsistent with Hayes v. Autin, 96-287 (La. App.
3rd Cir. 12/26/96), 685 So. 2d 691.5'
What problem was the legislature attempting to address in the 1996 and
1997 amendments, and what practical procedural changes were intended? Some
48. 432 So. 2d 968 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 969.
50. 1997 La. Acts No. 483, § 1.
51. 1997 La. Acts No. 483, § 4.
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answers appear discernible from three cases: Dietrich v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 2
Sassone v. Elder,53 and Hayes v. Autin 4
Dietrich was a post-Celotex tort case notable for its dissenting opinion
disagreeing with the reversal of a summary judgment. Suggesting that "it is time
the judicial attitude toward summary judgment be reexamined, 5 5 the dissent
remarked that even conceding the differences between state and federal law, the
case illustrated what the United States Supreme Court had in mind when stating
in Celotex:
One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to
isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we
think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this
purpose.5 6
The Dietrich dissent perceived Louisiana's attitude toward summary judgment,
after Celotex and before the recent amendments to Article 966, to be somewhat
penurious, and perceived the federal attitude to be more liberal.
Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court's dictum in Sassone v. Elder
referred to "the difference in state and federal practice in summary judgment
procedures in non-defamation cases," 7 and then proceeded to summarize federal
procedure:
In the federal system, when the nonmoving party bears the burden
of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact if the
nonmoving party cannot come forward at the summary judgment stage
with evidence of such sufficient quantity and quality for a reason-
able juror to find the party can satisfy his substantive evidentiary
burden.3
In contrast, the court made these statements about Louisiana procedure:
In Louisiana, however, there is a strong preference for full trial on
the merits in non-defamation cases. Because of the resulting heavy
burden on the mover,, a showing by the mover that the party with the
ultimate burden of proof likely will not meet his burden at trial is an
insufficient basis for summary judgment. Summary judgments are to
be sparingly granted. Any doubt is to be resolved against granting the
motion. 9
52. 540 So. 2d 358 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989).
53. 626 So. 2d 345 (La. 1993).
54. 685 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996), writ denied, 690 So. 2d 41 (1997).
55. 540 So. 2d at 363.
56. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986).
57. Sassone, 626 So. 2d at 351.
58. Id. (citing Celotex).
59. Id. at 352 (citations omitted).
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The Sassone statements of federal and Louisiana law are misleading. The
dictum correctly states federal law, but only where the moving party already has
carried the initial burden of production. The dictum also correctly states that the
moving party cannot obtain summary judgment under Louisiana law simply by
showing that the party with the burden of proof at trial "likely" will not meet his
burden. However, this statement does not conflict with federal procedure, but
simply recognizes that where reasonable minds could differ summary judgment
is inappropriate, even though the case appears likely to go against the party with
the burden of proof at trial.
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,6" decided the same day as Celotex, the
United States Supreme Court stated that the standard for granting summary
judgment mirrors the standard for granting a directed verdict. In discussing this
standard the Court explained:
If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary
judgment or for a directed verdict based on a lack of proof of a material
fact, the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence
unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded
jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.6 '
Put another way, the Court stated if reasonable minds could differ as to the
import of evidence, then a verdict should not be directed.62 This same
"reasonable minds" standard was applied by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Sanders v. Hercules Sheet Metal, Inc.:63
A motion for summary judgment must be granted when reasonable
minds must inevitably conclude that the mover is entitled to judgment
on the facts before the court.64
Not only do both Louisiana and Federal law use the same "reasonable
minds" standard, but under that standard both would reject a motion for summary
judgment showing merely that a plaintiff was not "likely" to meet his burden of
proof. Thus, any reasonable doubt is to be resolved against granting summary
judgment: to conclude that reasonable doubt exists is to conclude that reasonable
minds could differ. -
A salient point to be drawn from Dietrich and Sassone is that often-cited
summary judgment principles, through jurisprudential devolution, can become
meaningless or even misleading legal platitudes. Even though rooted in well-
reasoned procedural law, these principles can slip their contextual tether over
time, and can adversely affect judicial attitudes toward summary judgment. In
60. 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct 2505 (1986).
61. Id. at 252, 196 S. CL at 2512.
62. Id. at 251-52, 106 S. Ct at 2512.
63. 385 So. 2d 772 (La. 1980).
64. Id. at 775.
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turn, judicial attitudes and perceptions thereof can be the impetus for "reform"
legislation.
This point is further illustrated in Hayes v. Autin." In discussing the 1996
amendments to Article 966, the court correctly stated the intent of the legislature
to bring Louisiana's standard for summary judgment "closely in line with the
federal standard under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56(c).", 6 The court also gave a
correct summary of the burden-shifting aspects of summary judgment procedure.
However, the court additionally made these statements about Article 966 as
amended:
We fird that the amended article substantially changes the law of
summary judgment. Under the existing jurisprudence, the summary
judgment was not favored and was to be used only cautiously and
sparingly. The pleadings and supporting documents of the mover were
to be strictly scrutinized by the court, while the documents submitted by
the party in opposition were to be treated indulgently. Any doubt was
to be resolved against granting the summary judgment, and in favor of
trial on the merits ....
The jurisprudential presumption against granting the summary
judgment has been legislatively overruled by La.Code Civ.P. art.
966 as amended. In effect, the amendment "levels the playing
field" between the parties in two ways: first, the supporting
documentation submitted by the parties should be scrutinized
equally, and second, the overriding presumption in favor of trial
on the merits is removed.67
By twice amending Article 966, and by legislatively overruling all cases
inconsistent with Hayes, our legislature also appears to subscribe to Hayes'
perception of "the federal courts' more liberal standard for summary judg-
ment."68 However, while our legislature was amending Article 966, the federal
appellate courts were rendering cases reciting basic summary judgment principles
that run counter to the above-quoted statements from Hayes. As part of a
reexamination of attitudes toward summary judgment, we would do well to
review the following principles as set forth in 1996 and 1997 cases from each of
the eleven federal circuits:
First Circuit: "At the summary judgment stage, the trial court examines
the entire record 'in the light most flattering to the nonmovant and
indulg[es] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.' Only if the
record, viewed in that manner and without regard to credibility
65. 685 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996), writ denied, 690 So. 2d 41 (1997).
66. Id. at 694.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 695.
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determinations, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact may the
court enter summary judgment., 69
Second Circuit: "The court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. If there is any evidence
in the record from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in
favor of the non-moving party on a material issue of fact, summary
judgment is improper.""0
Third Circuit: "In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court
does not resolve factual disputes or make credibility determinations, and
must view the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion.""'
Fourth Circuit: "Summary judgment is proper if no material facts are
in dispute. In deciding whether facts are in dispute, the evidence of the
non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must
be drawn in his favor." 2
Fifth Circuit: "We review a grant of summary judgment de novo ....
We construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party without weighing the evidence, assessing its probative value, or
resolving any factual disputes.90
3
Sixth Circuit: "When reviewing a summary judgment motion, it is
essential that we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. '[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's
function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."'7 4
Seventh Circuit: "We review the district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo, taking the record in the light most favorable to the
non-movant .... Although summary judgment is an effective tool for
district courts to manage their caseload, they must avoid the temptation
to use summary judgment 'as an abbreviated trial."'7 5
Eighth Circuit: "Importantly, 'a party moving for summary judgment
is not entitled to a judgment merely because the facts he offers appear
more plausible than those tendered in opposition, or because it appears
that the adversary is unlikely to prevail at trial."' 6
69. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 959 (1st Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
70. Catlin v. Sobol, 93 F.3d 1112, 1116 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
71. Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp. 79 F.3d 1358, 1362 n.1 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted).
72. Jakubiak v. Perry, 101 F.3d 23, 26 (4th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
73. Williams v. Time Warner Operation, Inc., 98 F.3d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted).
74. Terry Barr Sales Agency, Inc. v. All-Lock Co., 96 F.3d 174, 178 (6th Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted).
75. American Int'l Adjustment Co. v. Galvin, 86 F.3d 1455, 1459 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted).
76. Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1354 (8th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
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Ninth Circuit: "In considering a motion for summary judgment, the
court must examine all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. However, 'in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the judge must view the evidencepresented through the prism
of the substantive evidentiary burden,' while leaving 'credibility
determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts' to the jury. ' 7
Tenth Circuit: "'Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine dispute over a material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law,' but the court 'must view the record in a
light most favorable to the parties opposing the motion for summary
judgment.' 78
Eleventh Circuit: "Where the non-movant presents direct evidence that,
if believed by the jury, would be sufficient to win at trial, summary
judgment is not appropriate even where the movant presents conflicting
evidence. It is not the court's role to weigh conflicting evidence or to
make credibility determinations; the non-movant's evidence is to be
accepted for purposes of summary judgment. 7 9
Moreover, in 1996 the United States Supreme Court stated that when conducting
a qualified immunity inquiry upon a motion for summary judgment, the court
looks to the evidence before it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (the
non-moving party).8" This statement does not indicate any change in the
Court's view of summary judgment procedure from views expressed in
Anderson:
Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not
those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary
judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the non-movant is
to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor. Neither do we suggest that the trial courts should act other than
with caution in granting summary judgment or that the trial court may
not deny summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe
that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.8
The recent federal jurisprudence unmistakably reveals that the playing field
is not level under Rule 56: the evidence still is construed in the light most
77. Reynolds v. San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
78. Wolford v. Lasater, 78 F.3d 484, 488 (10th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
79. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739,742 (1 Ith Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
80. See Behrens v. Pelleticr, 516 U.S. 279, 309, 116 S. Ct. 834, 840 (1996).
81. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2513-14 (1986)
(citations omitted).
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favorable to the nomnoving party; determining credibility and weighing
conflicting evidence still are trial matters. Nevertheless, to properly understand
the federal standard under Rule 56 is not to conclude that Louisiana's amend-
ments to summary judgment procedure were meaningless or unnecessary.
Changes in judicial attitudes toward summary judgment procedure through
reexamination and return to the norm have the same kind of practical results as
a substantive change in the law. By causing such reexamination, Act 483 and
its predecessor should result in judicial attitude adjustments for many, although
the adjustments will not all be in the same direction. Those who have been
applying a more conservative standard than proper under Rule 56 must take a
more liberal attitude toward summary judgment procedure, being mindful of the
Celotex analysis, especially where the non-moving party will have the burden of
persuasion at trial. On the other hand, those who would read Hayes as requiring
a more liberal standard than Rule 56 must adopt a more conservative view, being
mindful that a fair playing field is one on which summary judgment evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and on which jury
functions are not usurped. The danger of improper use of summary judgment
procedure exists at both extremes. If we only exchange one set of platitudes for
another, the proper attitudes toward summary judgment procedure still will elude
us.
C. Understanding Key Concepts
Judicial attitudes toward summary judgment procedure should be shaped not
only by an understanding of the burdens of production and persuasion as
explained in Celotex, but also by an understanding of the following: (1) a
genuine issue of material fact; (2) credibility determinations and evidence
weighing; and (3) "the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden." 2 A proper
understanding of these concepts is the key both to correctly assaying the
procedural boilerplate we see in the cases and to correctly assessing the practical
procedural changes we should see in the courtroom.
The only reason for a trial is to resolve genuine issues of material fact. By
determining whether or not such issues arepresent, summary judgmentprocedure
only determines whether or not a trial is necessary; thus, we see jurisprudence
condemning the use of summary judgment procedure as an abbreviated trial. A
trial is unnecessary if only legal issues are presented, and the elimination of
factual disputes through well planned discovery can lead to situations ripe for
summary judgment. Trial also is unnecessary if factual issues are not material.
Only disputes over facts "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law" 3 are material. For example, whether a tort defendant
adequately maintained the roof of a building may present a genuine factual issue,
82. Id. at 254, 106 S. Ct. at 2513.
83. Id. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510.
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but that issue is not material if the roof was destroyed by tomadic winds that
clearly would have destroyed a perfectly maintained roof.
While the "factual" and "material" requirements for issues are relatively easy
to understand, the requirement that a factual issue be "genuine" has been
problematic. The very mission of summary judgment procedure is to go behind
the pleadings in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial. However,
in light of the often-cited admonition against making credibility determinations
or weighing evidence on summary judgment, how can this mission be fully
accomplished if the non-moving party responds with any evidence, no matter
how implausible, such as an affidavit asserting the occurrence of events through
metaphysical means? The answer is that judges can, and do, weigh evidence and
make credibility determinations in a limited way when deciding if a material
factual issue is "genuine," i.e., "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." 4 Implicit in the "reasonable
minds" standard is a weighing process through which a court eliminates material
factual issues with only one reasonably possible outcome. Importantly, this
weighing only considers the reasonableness of the possibility that the fact finder
could reach different outcomes on a factual issue after a full trial on the merits;
the weighing does not consider which reasonably possible outcome is more
plausible. Understood in this way, the boilerplate warnings against weighing
evidence make sense.
When engaging in this weighing process, the judge must keep in mind that
witness credibility ordinarily cannot be adequately determinedin advance of trial
simply from reading a piece of paper. Any attorney with significant trial
experience can relate both to the unexpected pleasure of having a seemingly
shaky witness give convincing testimony, and to the nightmare of having a
seemingly confident witness completely fall apart on the witness stand.
Likewise, a judge must understand that even though a deposition or affidavit may
indicate a well qualified witness who will give credible testimony, the witness's
trial demeanor, tone of voice, and responses to cross-examination may destroy
credibility. The inability to adequately assess credibility in advance of trial
underlies the warnings to view the record without regard to credibility determina-
tions. On the other hand, nothing prohibits a judge from discounting affidavits
or depositions containing chimerical factual accounts.
A third concept affecting an understanding of summary judgment procedure
is the idea of viewing the evidence through what Anderson called "the prism of
the substantive evidentiary burden."85 This simply means that in determining
whether a genuine issue exists a judge must ask whether reasonable minds,
applying theproper evidentiarystandard, could find for either the plaintiff or the
defendant. Accordingly, if the substantive evidentiary standard at trial would be
"a preponderance of the evidence,"then the question is whether reasonable minds
84. Id., 106 S. Ct. at 1510.
85. Id. at 254, 106 S. Ct. at 2513.
[Vol. 59
MARK TATUM & WILLIAM NORRIS, III
could find for either side under that standard. However, if the intermediate
standard of "clear and convincing evidence" would apply at trial, then that
standard is factored into the question of whether a genuine issue exists. In
Anderson, the Court held that the "clear and convincing" standard of proof
should be taken into account in ruling on summary judgment motions in libel
suits brought by public figures. Likewise, in Mashburn v. Collin,86 the
Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
Moreover, if the New York Times standards may be invoked in a
case, the courts must apply them in assessing the summary procedure
evidence. Accordingly, in order for a genuine issue to exist concerning
the material fact of defendant's state of mind in making the alleged
defamatory expression of fact or opinion, the plaintiff-mover [sic] must
show that a judge or jury reasonably could find by clear and convincing
evidence that the expression of fact or opinion was made with knowing
or reckless falsity. Also, if there is no genuine issue of material fact,
the plaintiff-mover [sic] must show that a judge or jury reasonably
could find by clear and convincing evidence, after construing all of the
facts and inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in favor of the
plaintiff-mover [sic], that the alleged defamatory statement was made
with knowing or reckless falsity.8
7
Although the United States and Louisiana Supreme Courts independently
have reached the same conclusion about the role of the substantive evidentiary
standard in summary judgment procedure, the dissenters in Anderson may suggest
correctly that requiring application of the same standard of proof on summary
judgment that is applied at trial may be of little practical importance. Certainly,
the same concerns about chilling effects on First Amendment rights that justify
a more stringent standard of proof at trial also are present at earlier stages of
litigation, but the utility of the higher standard when asking only whether a
genuine issues exists is more limited than might be expected. To fully appreciate
why, we invite the reader to create a factual scenario in which reasonable minds,
on the one hand, might differ as to whether the plaintiff could carry his burden
under a "preponderance of the evidence" standard, but, on the other hand, could
not differ as to whether the plaintiff could carry his burden under a "clear and
convincing" standard. Justice Brennan could not; neither could we.
D. Summary
The recent significant changes in the language of Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure Article 966 concerning summary judgment can translate into
significant changes in the courtroom through a reexamination of and reunification
86. 355 So. 2d 879 (La. 1977).
87. Id. at 890 (footnotes omitted).
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with the federal law and jurisprudence upon which our law is based, and toward
which our legislature plainly intended to steer us. While some would see a
reunification occurring through a change in Louisiana's summary judgment
standard, we would suggest that the better view is a reunification occurring
through a change in judicial attitudes toward summary judgment procedure. This
change should be based not only on an understanding of the evidentiary burdens
regulating the "who, what, and when" of summary judgment procedure, but also
on an understanding of the procedure's purpose and the judge's role regarding
the "why and how." This latter, more fundamental understanding of the
procedure is necessary to go behind the jurisprudential boilerplate and strike the
proper balance between preventing unnecessary trials and preserving the right to
try genuine issues of material fact.
A final discussion topic is the scope of summary judgment. While a
summary judgment properly can terminate a lawsuit, our Code of Civil Procedure
always has allowed summary judgment for only part of the relief sought,88 and
Act 483 seems to have significantly broadened that scope. 9 However, this
topic is more closely associated with the subject of partial judgment than with
summary judgment procedure. Accordingly, we now turn to an examination of
the rewriting of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1915 and "the
perplexing problems of partial judgments."9
II. PARTIAL JUDGMENT: A STATE OF CONFUSION
Because litigation often involves multiple parties and multiple claims, every
civil procedure system must address the sometimes difficult problems associated
with appellate review of partial judgments. As explained by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc. :
Before the adoption of procedural rules liberalizing cumulation of
actions and joinder of parties, only judgments which finally adjudicated
all claims with regard to all parties were appealable. When liberal
joinder provisions were adopted, it became obvious that appeals should
be available from some partial judgments when a party had a clearly
distinct claim or defense and should not be required to remain in the
action awaiting lengthy litigation by other parties. On the other hand,
there were efficiency advantages to limiting the number of appeals in
multiple-party and multiple-claim litigation."
88. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 966 under which one may move for a summary judgment for "all
or part of the relief for which he has prayed."
89. See infra text under subheading Confusion on Partial Summary Judgments.
90. See Douglass v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 695 So. 2d 953, 957 (La. 1997).
91. 616 So. 2d 1234 (La. 1993).
92. Id. at 1239-40.
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Ordinarily, immediate review of a partial judgment is not necessary because
the judgment can be reviewed on appeal of the final judgment rendered at the
end of case. But even so, when both fairness to the litigants and efficiency of
the judicial process are considered in a particular case, the balance may tip in
favor of immediate review. As a result, a civil procedure system must develop
rules to deal with two related problems: (1) identifying with clarity when an
immediate appeal of a partial judgment is proper; and (2) identifying with
certainty when appellate delays begin to run for partial judgments.
Ever since the enactment of our Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, up until
the passage of Act 483 of 1997, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1915
addressed these problems by setting forth an exclusive list of immediately
appealable partial final judgments.93 What this approach lacked in terms of
flexibility was balancedby what it provided in terms of certainty and uniformity.
Largely eliminated were appeals taken out of caution caused by uncertainty, as
well as missed appeals caused by failure to recognize the start of appellate
delays. Largely avoided also were judge-to-judge differences in allowing
immediate appeals of partial judgments.
The new version of Article 1915, although still containing a list of partial
adjudications, largely has abandoned the prior approach in favor of one closely
paralleling Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).' 4 Under the federal
approach, the immediate appealability of a partial final decision essentially is left
to the discretion of the trial judge who knows the case and can balance
competing factors.' 5 This approach allows greater flexibility to fit the particular
case, but also allows for greater judge-to-judge differences in application, as long
as the differences fall within the judges' broad discretion.
The relative virtues of the approaches used in old Article 1915 and new
Article 1915 are debatable. Of more immediate concern are practical implemen-
tation problems with the new approach. Because the new approach is a drastic
departure from its predecessor, some preparation of the judiciary would have
been advisable to promote both a smooth transition and a more uniform
application. However, the act not only caught many judges by surprise, but also
gave judges no guidance on how to perform their new roles.
Presumably, the parallels between Article 1915 and Rule 54 indicate a
legislative intent for courts to seek guidance from the federal provisions and
jurisprudence. However, our courts' ability to do so is seriously undercut by
discrepanciesbetween state and federal law concerning the triggering of appellate
delays, the certification of a partial adjudication for immediate appeal, and the
scope of a partial summary judgment. Because of the many questions raised by
Act 483, this area of the law has been placed in a state of confusion.
93. Id. at 1240-41.
94. See supra note 8.
95. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
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A. Confusion on Appellate Delays
New Article 1915 creates confusion on appellate delays because it is
an imperfect amalgam of state and federal elements. Under Louisiana law,
the immediate trigger for the running of appellate delays typically is either
the expiration of new trial delays or the mailing of notice of a court's
refusal to grant a timely application for new trial.96 In turn, new trial
delays typically begin to run either on the day after a final judgment is
signed, or on the day after notice of judgment, when required, has been
mailed or served." Thus, the signing of a final judgment is the initial
trigger for the running of appellate delays; without a signed judgment an
appeal is improper."8
In contrast, the immediate triggering event in the federal system is
entry of judgment, which occurs when the clerk makes an entry in the
civil docket, briefly showing the substance of the judgment.99  The
appellate delays begin to run from entry of judgment; a district court
judgment is ineffective until entered."W In cases with multiple claims or
parties, a federal court under Rule 54(b) may direct the entry of a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties "only
upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."'0 ' This process of
express determination and direction is commonly referred to either as
"certification" of the adjudication, or as making a "certificate,"'10 2 even
though these words are not actually used in Rule 54(b). In the absence
of certification, a partial adjudication under Rule 54(b) does not terminate
the action as to any claims or parties, and the partial adjudication is
subject to revision.' Therefore, certification is an initial trigger for the
running of appellate delays for partial adjudications; without proper
certification no final judgment can be entered.
New Article 1915(B) borrows heavily from Rule 54(b), but fails to
account for the different triggering events used in the state and federal
systems. Compare the provisions of Article 1915(B) with those of Rule
54(b):
96. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2087.
97. See La. Code Civ. P. artL. 1974.
98. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1911.
99. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 and 79(a).
100. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(A) and 3 Moore et al., supra note 24, § 25.0314], [5].
101. See supra note 8.
102. See 3 Moore et al., supra note 24, § 25.05[3].
103. See supra note 8.
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Article 1915(B)
(1) When a court renders a partial
judgment or partial summary judg-
ment or sustains an exception in
part, as to one or more but less than
all of the claims, demands, issues,
theories, or parties, whether in an
original demand, reconventional
demand, cross-claim, third party
claim, or intervention, the judgment
shall not constitute a final judgment
unless specifically agreed to by the
parties or unless designated as a
final judgment by the court after an
express determination that there is
no just reason for delay.
(2) In the absence of such a deter-
mination and designation, any order
or decision which adjudicates fewer
than all claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the par-
ties, shall not terminate the action
as to any of the claims or parties
and shall not constitute a final judg-
ment for the purpose of an immedi-
ate appeal. Any such order or deci-
sion issued may be revised at any
time prior to the rendition of the
judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the rights and liabilities of
parties.
Rule 54(b)
When more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action,
whether as a claim, counter claim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, or
when multiple parties are involved,
the court may direct the entry of a
final judgment as to one or more
but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express deter-
mination that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express di-
rection for the entry of judgment.
In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or
other form of decision, however
designated which adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the par-
ties shall not terminate the action as
to any of the claims or parties, and
the order or other form of decision
is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adju-
dicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the par-
ties.
This comparison shows that Louisiana now has its own "certification"
requirement that must be met before a partial adjudication can become "a final
judgment for the purpose of an immediate appeal." This new triggering event
consists of a determination and designation, rather than the federal rule's
determination and direction, because Louisiana has not adopted the federal
provisions on entry of judgment. We continue to use the signing of a judgment
as the initial triggering event for appellate delay purposes. Confusion on
appellate delays arises in cases where the court does not certify a partial
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adjudication at the time of signing, but subsequently does so either after a party's
request, or sua sponte. Appellate delays plainly cannot begin to run until
certification occurs, but are delays immediately triggered by certification? The
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure certainly does not say so.
Furthermore, like Rule 54, Article 1915 sets no time limit for seeking
certification.0 4 Accordingly, the certification provisions of Article 1915 should
not be interpreted to trigger appellate delays retroactively to signing. Such an
interpretation would trap litigants who waited beyond what would have been the
expiration of appellate delays under the old law to seek certification under the
new law. On the other hand, for certification to immediately trigger appeal
delays prospectively, must this certification be in writing and signed by the court
as required for final judgments? Must notice of certification be given? If so, can
mailing of certification suffice, or is actual notice necessary? These are some of
the basic, important questions spawned by the mismatch of state and federal
provisions.
Appellate courts might avoid what could be substantial judicial legislation
by holding that because the current codal provisions for appellate delays do not
clearly apply to partial final judgments, the appellate delays for such judgments
do not begin to run before the signing of the final judgment that ends the case.
Such a holding would solve some problems, but would cause others.
Consider, for example, a partial adjudication that dismisses a party from the
lawsuit. Until certified, the adjudication is not a final judgment for purposes of
an immediate appeal either in state or federal court, and the dismissed party
possibly could be called back into the litigation later. To prevent this result, a
dismissed party strategically might seek certification in the federal system to
trigger the running of appellate delays. However, if certification does not
immediately trigger the running of appellate delays in Louisiana, this strategy
would be ineffective. Of course, a certified judgment could become definitive
following an appeal. 5 But by the time the appeal was concluded the remain-
ing trial court litigation also might be concluded. Moreover, a party should not
be allowed to appeal a judgment just to make the judgment definitive. An appeal
is proper only when a party seeks to have a judgment "revised, modified, set
aside, or reversed."'"
The appellate delay problems generated by new Article 1915 call for a
legislative solution. If Louisiana continues to follow the federal approach and
requires certification for some or all partial adjudications listed under Article
1915(A), then the legislature will need to amend a number of procedural articles
104. Schaefer v. First National Bank of Lincolnwood, 465 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1972), held that
as a general rule it is an abuse of discretion for a district judge to grant a motion for a Rule 54(b)
order when the motion isfiled more than 30 days after entry of the adjudication to which it relates.
This holding has not been followed in other cases, but has been criticized in Bank of New York v.
Hoyt, 108 F.R.D. 184, 185-86 (D.R.L. 1985).
105. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2167.
106. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2082.
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to properly link certification provisions with appellate delay provisions. Before
discussing ways this task could be accomplished, we next examine problems
associated with the process of certification.
B. Confusion on Certification
Louisiana's certificationprocess has two related sources of confusion. First,
because of the language differences betweenArticle 1915(B) and Rule 54(b), we
have confusion concerning how similar the legislature intended the state and
federal certification processes to be. Second, because we are patterning the state
certification process on the federal certification process, we have confusion
borrowed from the federal jurisprudence under Rule 54(b).
To sort through this confusion, we begin by considering that both Louisiana
courts and federal courts have historic policies against piecemeal appeals." 7
Our supreme court observed in Subaru that Article 1915 was designed to limit
a court's authority to render an appealable partial final judgment, and that if all
such judgments were immediately appealable, "there would be intolerable
.problems of multiple appeals and piecemeal litigation.'... In a similar vein,
federal courts have disfavored routine use of Rule 54(b). Judge (now Justice)
Kennedy explained in Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Archer" 9
Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case
in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings
and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalancedby pressuring
needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some
claims or parties."'
These policy considerations indicate that a Louisiana trial judge should employ
a careful and conservative approach to certification.
Consider next the proper function of a district court and an appellate court
in Rule 54(b) cases. In Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., the
United States Supreme Court outlined the steps for a district court to follow in
making a determination under Rule 54(b):
A district court must first determine that it is dealing with a "final
judgment." It must be a "judgment" in the sense that it is a decision
upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be "final" in the sense
that it is "an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the
course of a multiple claims action."
107. See Banks v. State Farm Ins. Co., 708 So. 2d 523 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1998).
108. Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So. 2d 1234,1241 (La. 1993).
109. 655 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1981).
110. Id. at 965.
111. 446 U.S. 1, 100 S. Ct. 1460 (1980).
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Once having found finality, the district court must go on to
determine whether there is any just reason for delay. Not all final
judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even
if they are in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved
claims. The function of the district court under the Rule is to act as a
"dispatcher." It is left to the sound judicial discretion of the district
court to determine the "appropriate time" when each final decision in
a multiple claims action is ready for appeal. This discretion is to be
exercised "in the interest of sound judicial administration.""..2
The Court also stated that there are two aspects to the proper function of an
appellate court in Rule 54(b) cases:
The court of appeals must, of course, scrutinize the district court's
evaluation of such factors as the interrelationship of the claims so as to
prevent piecemeal appeals in cases which should be reviewed only as
single units. But once such juridical concerns have been met, the
discretionary judgment of the district court should be given substantial
deference, for that court is "the one most likely to be familiar with the
case and with any justifiable reasons for delay." The reviewing court
should disturb the trial court's assessment of the equities only if it can
say that the judge's conclusion was clearly unreasonable." 3
Cued by the federal approach, a Louisiana trial judge's first certification
questions should concern "finality," followed by questions concerning whether
to certify a proper partial final judgment. Louisiana defines a final judgment as
one "that determines the merits in whole or in part."" 4  In contrast, an
interlocutory judgment does not determine the merits, "but only preliminary
matters in the course of the action."" 5 Judgments denying exceptions, denying
motions for summary judgments, ruling on discovery or evidentiary issues, or
deciding purely procedural issues generally are examples of judgments that
cannot be properly certified because they are not final. A judge cannot, through
certification, turn an interlocutory judgment into a final judgment, and a
Louisiana appellate court should not review the question of finality under an
abuse of discretion standard. Instead, that question should be reviewed de novo
in every case where a partial adjudication is certified.
112. Id. at 7-8, 100 S. Ct. at 1465-65 (citations omitted).
.113. Id. at 10, 100 S. Ct. at 1466 (citations omitted).
114. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1841 provides:
A judgment is the determination of the rights of the parties in an action and may award
any relief to which the parties are entitled. It may be interlocutory or final.
A judgment that does not determine the merits but only preliminary matters in the
course of the action is an interlocutory judgment.
A judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part is a final judgment.
I5. Id.
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Because Louisiana has its own codal definition of "final judgment," as well
as its own jurisprudence thereon, we need not borrow confusion from federal law
where a "verbal formula" for finality has proved elusive."" Still, we have our
own finality problems under Article 1915. The first problem concerns the
exclusivity yel non of the list in Article 1915(A):
A final judgment may be rendered and signed by the court, even
though it may not grant the successful party or parties all of the relief
prayed for, or may not adjudicate all of the issues in the case, when the
court:
(1) Dismisses the suit as to less than all of the parties, defendants,
third party plaintiffs, third party defendants, or intervenors.
(2) Grants a motion for judgment on the pleadings, as provided by
Articles 965, 968 and 969.
(3) Grants a motion for summary judgment, as provided by
Articles 966 through 969, including a summary judgment granted
pursuant to Article 966(E).
(4) Signs a judgment on either the principal or incidental demand,
when the two have been tried separately, as provided by Article 1038.
(5) Signs a judgment on the issue of liability when that issue has
been tried separately by the court, or when, in a jury trial, the issue of
liability has been tried before a jury and the issue of damages is to be
tried before a different jury.
Because the listing in old Article 1915 was exclusive, we might conclude the
same is true of the new listing. After all, Act 483 did not change items one,
two, four, and five, and even item three still concerns partial summary
judgments. Furthermore, if we were completely adopting the federal approach,
there would be no necessity for any listing. On the other hand, Article
1915(B)(1) addresses finality when a court renders a partial judgment or partial
summary judgment or sustains an exception in part.'7  Could the latter
reference be to a partial exception of no cause of action? If so, such a judgment
is not on the list. If not, the latter reference appears unnecessary because item
one covers a judgment sustaining an exception in part and dismissing less than
all parties, and the term "partial judgment" in Paragraph (B)(1) covers such a
judgment as well. Of course, "partial judgment" also covers "partial summary
judgment," yet Article 1915(B)(1) refers to both.
Because a trial court can determine whether there is any just reason to delay
an immediate appeal of a final adjudication, an exclusive listing arguably is
116. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 94 S. CL 2140 (1974), the court stated:
No verbal formula yet devised can explain prior finality decisions with unerring accuracy
or provide an utterly reliable guide for the future.
417 U.S. at 170, 94 S. Ct. at 2149.
117. See supra note 3.
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unnecessary, and a trial court arguably should be able to certify any final
adjudication, including one resulting from a partial exception of no cause of
action"' or from a "mini-trial." Nevertheless, because Article 1915(A) still
contains a listing, and because piecemeal appeals are not favored, a litigant
would be wise still to consider the possibility that the listing is exclusive. We
suggest that the legislature amend Article 1915 to make its intent clear. In the
meantime, as discussed subsequently, 9 a litigant apparently can obtain a
partial adjudication on virtually any "merits" issue via a motion for partial
summary judgment covered by item three.
Another finality problem arises from language in Article 1915(B)(1) that
allows a partial adjudication to constitute a "final judgment" not only if certified
by the court, but also if "specifically agreed to by the parties." 2' This curious
language has no counterpart in Rule 54(b), and the meaning of "final judgment"
is unclear. The sharp contrast between "final judgment" in Article 1915(B)(1)
and "final judgment for the purpose of an immediate appeal" in Article
1915(B)(2),' 2 1 as well as the close proximity of these two terms, strongly
suggests that only certification by the trial court creates an immediately
appealable partial judgment. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal so held in
Banks v. State Farm Insurance Co.' where the trial court granted a partial
summary judgment on the issue of liability alone, the parties agreed that the
partial adjudication was a "final judgment" in accordance with Article
1915(B)(1), but the trial court made no express determination that there was no
just reason for delay of an immediate appeal.
The court first observed that the 1997 amendments to Article 1915 were
patterned on Rule 54 under which a trial court only could enter a final judgment
if the trial court certified the judgment; the court also considered Subaru's
warning about the danger of "intolerable problems of multiple appeals and
piecemeal litigation,'"" especially in light of the amendments' apparent
expansion of the scope of summary judgments. After concluding that Louisi-
ana's current protection against intolerable piecemeal appeals is the certification
requirement in Article 1915(B), the court addressed the issue before it:
Considering: (1) historic state and federal policies against
piecemeal appeals; (2) the fact that the appealability of judgments has
never been a matter controlled by the litigants in either state or federal
118. Note, however, that under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 934 a judgment
sustaining an exception of no cause of action must allow amendment of the petition when the
grounds of the objection pleaded may be removed by amendment. For this reason certification often
will be inappropriate for a judgment sustaining a partial exception of no cause of action.
119. See infra discussion under subheading Confusion on Partial Summary Judgment.
120. See supra note 3.
121. See id.
122. 708 So. 2d 523 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1998).
123. Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So. 2d 1234, 1241 (La.
1993).
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courts; and (3) the prohibition in federal courts against certification as
a courtesy or accommodation to counsel, we conclude that our
legislature did not intend for the parties, by agreement, to be able to
create a final judgmentfor the purpose ofan immediate appeal, despite
language in Article 1915(B)(1) that allows the parties to specifically
agree for a judgment to constitute a "final judgment." Our conclusion
is supported by the language of Article 1915(B) that contrasts the term
"final judgment" in 1915(B)(1) with the term "final judgment for the
purpose of an immediate appeal" in 1915(B)(2) ....
Thus, although the presence of a particular type of partial judgment
on the list of Article 1915(A), as well as the agreement of the parties
for there to be a "final judgment" under Article 1915(B)(1) are matters
for the trial court to consider for purposes of certification, neither factor
mandates certification. Instead, partial judgments should be certified
only after a case-by-case consideration of the judicial administrative
interests and equities involved. 4
The court's decision is in harmony with the policies against piecemeal appeals.
A contrary decision would have taken from the courts a matter very important
to the interest of sound judicial administration.
Granting that certification by the litigants is a bad idea, what reasonable
interpretation can be given to the language concerning "final judgment" by
agreement of the parties? One interpretation could recognize the parties' ability
to agree that future litigation will turn on appellate resolution of a partial
adjudication. For example, a trial court might be unwilling to certify a partial
adjudication solely declaring the existence of insurance coverage. Such an
adjudication would not require any payment to be made, and the need for
appellate review could disappear if the insured was found to have no liability.
However, the parties all might agree to a settlement, the terms of which
depended on a definitive resolution of the coverage question. This agreement
would make the trial court's judgment "final" to the extent that no further
decisions on the merits would be necessary in the trial court. Although
certification by the court still should be employed, a trial court could abuse its
discretion by failing to certify in such instances. This interpretation of the
language concerning agreement of the parties does not interfere with the interests
of sound judicial administration, but neither cures the language's obscurity, nor
adds much to the article that logic would not dictate in the language's absence.
Another interpretation could recognize the parties' agreement as one simply
expressing the desire, or at least the willingness, for a judgment to be immediate-
ly appealable. This interpretation would give a novel meaning to the word
124. The court cited United States General, Inc. v. Albert, 792 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1986), for
holding that certification of a judgment should not be granted as a courtesy or accommodation to
counsel.
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"final," but would be acceptable from the perspective of sound judicial
administration if the agreement were viewed merely as a factor for the trial court
to consider for certification purposes. Still, the more important consideration
would be why the parties entered the agreement. In federal court, agreement of
the parties is one way to properly bring the matter of certification to the
district court's attention; this also may be done by motion of a party, and a
district court on it's own motion may decide whether or not to certify.' All
in all, the language concerning "final judgment" by agreement of the parties
seems to obfuscate more than improve. We suggest the legislature delete this
language.
After a Louisiana trial judge has favorably determined finality questions, the
next step in certification is deciding whether there is any just reason for delay
of an immediate appeal. A trial court's discretion comes into play here; such
decisions should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard because the
trial court is "the one most likely to be familiar with the case and with any
justifiable reasons for delay."'2 6 Furthermore, while the proper appellate role
should not include reweighing the equities or reassessing the facts underlying a
decision to certify, an appellate court should make certain "that the conclusions
derived from those weighings and assessments are juridically sound and
supported by the record."'"
The United States Supreme Court has admitted that in Rule 54(b)
cases the question of when a district court should exercise its discretion
to certify "presents issues not always easily resolved, ' and because of the
large number of possible situations that can occur, the Court was reluctant "either
to fix or sanction narrow guidelines for the district courts to follow."'29 Never-
theless, the court in Banks,"0 cited the listing in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Philadelphia Electric Co."' for its guiding factors that a trial court may
consider:
(1) The relationship betweenthe adjudicated and unadjudicatedclaims;
(2) The possibility that the need for review might or might not be
mooted by future developments in the district court;
(3) The possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to
consider the same issue a second time;
(4) The presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could
result in setoff against the judgment sought to be made final;
125. See 3 Moore et al., supra note 24, § 25.05[3].
126. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1,10,100 S. Ct. 1460,1466(1980).
127. Id., 100 S. Ct. at 1466.
128. Id., 100 S. CL at 1466.
129. Id. at 10-11, 100 S. Ct at 1466.
130. See Banks v. State Farm Ins. Co., 708 So. 2d 523 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1998).
131. 521 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1975).
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(5) Miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency
considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing
claims, expense, and the like.'
Because Louisiana trial courts should give written reasons for certification to
facilitate appellate review, 3' the listed factors may prove helpful in articulating
the certification rationale.
Judges also should consider that the mere presence of an adjudication on the
list in Article 19 15(A) does not automatically warrant certification. The presence
of a judgment on the list certainly can be a strong indicator that there are factors
favoring certification, but as observed in Banks, the list is better viewed as
containing judgments that may be certified after a case-by-case consideration of
the judicial administrative interests and equities involved."'
One additional certification problem considered here is the requirement of
"an express determination that there is no just reason for delay."' 5  The
trouble is well illustrated by and discussed in the Federal Fifth Circuit's opinion
in Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashion Hamburgers, Inc."6 The court took up the case
en banc to consider whether a district could certify a judgment under Rule 54(b)
without reciting that "no just reason for delay" existed for entry. The ten-judge
majority concluded:
If the language in the order appealed from, either independently or
together with related portions of the record referred to in the order,
reflects the district court's unmistakable intent to enter a partial final
judgment under Rule 54(b), nothing else is required to make the order
appealable. We do not require the judge to mechanically recite the
words "no just reason for delay.""' 7
Nevertheless, the majority admitted that the close vote therein demonstrated that
the majority's conclusion obviously was not the only interpretation possible, and
noted that the federal circuits were sharply divided on the issue."8
The brisk seven-judge dissent criticized the majority for at worst declaring
"express" to mean the same thing as "implied," and at best discarding the plain
meaning of the rule for the sake of the majority's own policy preferences." 9
The dissent considered the majority's opinion to cloud the rule,"' and noted
that some circuits impose much more exacting requirements: some insist on a
132. Id. at 364.
133. See Banks v. State Farm Ins. Co., 708 So. 2d 523 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1998).
134. Id.
135. See supra note 8.
136. 908 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1990).
137. Id. at 1220.
138. Id. at 1221 n.2.




statement of reasons for concluding that there is no just reason for delay; others
require recitation of the "talismanic" seven words; still others hold that merely
mentioning Rule 54(b) in the order is insufficient.' 4'
A jurisdictional defect exists when a litigant appeals an uncertified partial
adjudication. Absent certification there is no final judgment to appeal. A similar
jurisdictional defect exists when an appeal is taken before a final judgment has
been signed.'42 In Overmier v. Traylor,' the supreme court held that while
an appeal was premature prior to the signing of judgment, the defect was cured
once the court signed the final judgment. By analogy, the premature appeal of
an uncertified partial adjudication can be cured by subsequent certification. The
court in Banks, rather than dismiss the appeal, remanded an uncertified partial
adjudication for the trial court's express determination, with written reasons, of
whether there was no just reason for delay.'44 Certainly, when a district court
gives written reasons for certification, there can be no doubt that certification
was intended, and written reasons often will be very helpful, if not essential for
an appellate court to perform its duty of reviewing the propriety of certification.
Thus, if a Louisiana appellate court has any doubt whatsoever about whether
certification was intended, or about why certification was granted, the court can
remand for written reasons for certification, regardless of what language the trial
court did or did not use when granting the motion for appeal. If our appellate
courts uniformly follow this approach, problems concerning the adequacy of
certification should be minimal.
C. Confusion on Partial Summary Judgments
To attempt to assess the law's direction in this confusing area, one first
should trace the path our case law already has traversed. A good place to pick
up the trail is Subaru,4 ' which correctly held that because the exclusive list in
former Article 1915 did not specifically authorize a partial judgment on an
exception of no cause of action, such a judgment (that dismissed no litigants)
was not immediately appealable. Significantly, the court stated in a footnote:
We ... reserve for another day the question of whether a partial
summary judgment that merely decides one of several claims, defenses,
or issues without dismissing any party, is a final judgment which is
authorized by Article 1915 and which therefore must be appealed
immediately in order to prevent the judgment from acquiring the
authority of a thing adjudged.' 6
141. Id. at 1228.
142. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1911 (requiring every final judgment to be signed by the judge
before an appeal may be taken).
143. 475 So. 2d 1094 (1985).
144. See Banks v. State Farm Ins. Co., 708 So. 2d 523 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1998).
145. See Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So. 2d 1234 (La. 1993).
146. Id. at 1241 n.12.
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By further stating in dictum that there appeared to be no logical reason to
treat a partial summary judgment differently from a partial judgment on an
exception of no cause of action, the court strongly hinted that it would answer
the reserved question in the negative. 47 However, this hint subsequently
turned out to be an excellent example of the treachery of dictum. In a four-to-
three opinion in Douglass v. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation,'" the court
answered the question in the affirmative.
In Ochsner, a patient who receivedseveral units of blood and blood products
subsequently was diagnosed as positive for HIV. She filed suit, alleging in part
that Oschner Medical Foundation was negligent and was strictly liable for a
defective product (blood) and breach of an implied warranty of merchantability.
The trial court dismissed the latter two claims via partial summary judgment, and
the plaintiff sought supervisory writs rather than appealing. The appellate court
denied writs, as well as the plaintiff's subsequent request to treat her writ
application as a motion and order for appeal. The supreme court then granted
writs to review the partial summary judgment.
In holding that the proper vehicle for seeking review of a partial summary
judgment was an appeal and normally not a writ, the Oschner majority relied on
several procedural articles: (1) Article 1915 that specifically refers to the
appealability of a partial summary judgment; (2) Article 966 that provides either
party may move for summary judgment for all or part of the relief for which he
has prayed; (3) Article 968 that states summary judgments are final judgments;
and (4) Article 1841 that states a judgment that decides the merits in whole in
part is a final judgment.149 The court stated:
These articles clearly authorize the rendition of a summary
judgment which disposes of one or more, but less than all, of the claims
or issues presented in a case. These articles also clearly provide that
such a judgment is final. 5 '
The majority still was willing to convert the plaintiff's writ application into an
appeal because the law regarding the finality and appealability of partial
summary judgments arguably was not settled prior to Oschner.
Justice Lemmon (who wrote Subaru) dissented in Oschner, considering
the case to be "a classic example of the improper use of a summary
judgment to decide a single issue without granting any of the reliefsought
by either party.""' He noted that under Article 1841 a judgment is a
determination of rights of the parties and may, award any relief to which
the parties are entitled, and that Article 966(A)(1) provides that a party
147. Id.
148. 695 So. 2d 953 (La. 1997), writ denied, 713 So. 2d 473 (1998).
149. Id. at 955.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 956.
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may move for summary judgment for all or a part of the relief for which
he has prayed. However, the trial court's striking of one of the plaintiff's
theories of recovery did not grant the defendant all or part of the relief
sought (denial of the asserted obligation to pay money damages). Thus,
Justice Lemmon did not consider the judgment to be a valid partial final
judgment requiring an immediate appeal. Instead, the plaintiff could seek
immediate review by applying for a supervisory writ.'
Likewise, Justice Kimball's dissent focused on the fact that the partial
summary judgment merely eliminated some theories of liability. She cited
numerous Louisiana cases that rejectedpartial summary judgments deciding only
issues or theories of recovery, but determining no part of the relief claimed by
any party. She also criticized the majority opinion for being contrary to the
court's reasoning in Subaru, and concluded that unnecessary piecemeal litigation
would result.'53
The Oschner dissents emphasized the importance of the word "relief'
with respect to partial summary judgments. Without question our courts
had long required a summary judgment to grant relief beyond merely
determining a legal issue. The Supreme Court explained the rationale for
this requirement in Dryades Savings and Loan Association v. Lassiter,'54
where the district court had granted the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment on a constitutionality issue without adjudicating the plaintiff's
claim for relief:
[T]he use of a motion for summary judgment to determine the issue
of the constitutionality of the statute in controversy would result in
piecemeal adjudication and appeal. As Judge Pike Hall, Jr., stated in
Smith v. Hanover Insurance Co., supra:
Plaintiff's use of the motion for summary judgment to
obtain a ruling on his cause of action without seeking
any part of the relief he claims is an unauthorized use of
a procedural vehicle and illustrates the problem of piece-
meal adjudication and appeal which can result from the
misuse of provisions intended to streamline our civil
procedure.155
Once again we see the importance of Louisiana's policy of avoiding
piecemeal adjudications and appeals. The Oschner majority opinion did not
necessarily overrule the jurisprudence requiring that summary judgments grant
some relief. Under a narrow reading of the majority opinion, a party aggrieved
by such a partial adjudication simply was required to immediately seek an
152. Id.
153. Id. at 958-59.
154. 400 So. 2d 894 (La. 1981).
155. Id. at 896 (quoting 363 So. 2d 719, 721 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978)).
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appeal; perhaps a party at least still could have objected in the trial court to a
motion seeking an improper summary judgment. 156 However, Act 483
obviated any need to puzzle over Oschner.
After Act 483, Article 966(E) provides:
A summary judgment may be rendered dispositive of a particular issue,
theory of recovery, cause of action, or defense, in favor of one or more
parties, even though the granting of the summary judgment does not
dispose of the entire case.
Furthermore, Article 1915(A)(3) specifically refers to the granting of a summaryjudgment pursuant to Article 966(E)." Thus, Act 483 appears to be inconsis-
tent with the case law recognized in Justice Kimball's Oschner dissent. 5 '
The legislative adoption of the federal approach to partial adjudications did
not mandate Act 483's inconsistency with the case law. Rule 54(b) expressly is
limited to instances where more than one claim for relief is presented or multiple
parties are involved." 9 The rule does not apply when a single claim is based on
multiple theories of liability. For example, where a plaintiff sought recovery of
cleanup costs for a chemical leak, both on a negligence theory and a strict liability
theory, and a district court granted summary judgment solely on the strict liability
theory and certified thejudgment under Rule 54(b), the Seventh Circuit dismissed
the appeal, holding that the two liability theories constituted only one claim. 6'
156. Ochsner was puzzling because it recognized that the summary judgment therein was
improper, but then seemed to approve examination of the merits of the judgment on appeal. The
specific holding was: "[mrhe proper vehicle for seeking review of the grant of a partial summary
judgment is by way of appeal and ... a supervisory writ normally will not lie to correct an
Improperly granted partial summary judgment." 695 So. 2d at 955 (emphasis added). One might
read this holding, standing alone, as being in harmony with Smith v. Hanover Insurance Co. (quoted
with approval in Dryades 400 So. 2d 894). In Smith the appellate court observed that an improper
summary judgment should go back to the trial court because the partial judgment either was not
appealable or was inappropriate procedurally. The court concluded the judgment was appealable and
the appellate court had jurisdiction, but the judgment was "not authorized by procedural law and,
therefore, should be set aside." 363 So. 2d at 720. Thus, the Smith court never reached the merits
of the partial judgment.
However, Ochsner observed that Herlitz Const. Co. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inc., 396 So.
2d 878 (La. 1981), had upheld the appropriateness of deciding the merits of a supervisory writ which
could terminate litigation and avoid a possibly useless future trial on the merits. Ochsner correctly
stated that the action in Herlitz was taken in the interest of judicial efficiency and fundamental
fairness to the litigants, but then stated that an immediate appeal of a partial summary judgment was
"equally fundamentally fair," and would "terminate the litigation and avoid the wastes and possibly
useless future trial with equal efficiency." 695 So. 2d at 956.
After Ochsner and before enactment of Act 483, the extent of an appellate court's power to correct
a trial court's error in granting an improper summary judgment was unclear.
157. See supra note 3.
158. Douglass v. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, 695 So. 2d 953 (La. 1997), writ denied,
713 So. 2d 473 (1998).
159. See supra note 8.
160. See Indiana HarborBeltRy. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 860 F.2d 1441 (7th Cir. 1988).
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Similarly, the Fifth Circuit dismissed an appeal where the district court
adjudicated only one of two alternative theories of liability.6 The court
stated:
True multiplicity is not present where, as here, the plaintiff merely
presents alternative theories, drawn from the law of the same sovereign,
by which the same set of facts might give rise to a single liability.62
While the requirement of "relief' for a proper summary judgment under
former state law and the requirement of "multiplicity" for a properly certifiable
judgment under current federal law may at first glance bear no similarity, both
ultimately are concerned with protecting the interests of sound judicial
administration and the historic policies against piecemeal appeals. Unless
properly interpreted and applied, current state law could set the stage for
piecemeal litigation on a scale never before possible in Louisiana, and still not
possible in federal courts'.
One might attempt to argue that summary judgment in Louisiana still
requires the granting of "relief' as understood under prior jurisprudence because
Article 966(A) 63 was not amended by Act 483 and still refers to moving for
a summary judgment for all or part of the relief for which one has prayed.
However, in light of the plain language of Article 966(E), the reference to that
language in Article 1915(A)(3), and the fact that the language would have been
totally unnecessary unless a change was intended, the more plausible argument
is that Act 483 gave a new definition to "relief." Can a new definition be made
to fit the current codal scheme?
Article 1841 always has defined a final judgment as one that determines the
merits in whole or in part,'6" while Article 1915 continues to permit rendition
of a final judgment that may not grant all of the relief prayed for, or may not
adjudicate all the issues in the case.6 ' Furthermore, Article 1871 on declara-
tory judgments permits courts to declare rights, status, and other legal relations
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.'" Such a declaration has
the force and effect of a final judgment. 67
161. See Schexnaydre v. Travelers Ins. Co., 527 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1976).
162. Id. at 856.
163. See supra note 2.
164. See supra note 114.
165. See supra note 3.
166. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1871:
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions may declare rights, status, and other
legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or
proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree
is prayed for; and the existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude ajudgment
for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. The declaration shall have the force
and effect of a final judgment or decree.
167. Id.
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The language of these articles can be read to allow a partial final judgment
that decides some of the merits issues (rights, status, and other legal relations),
but awards no "further relief." Such a reading would be compatible with Article
966(E) and would allow virtually any merits issue to be addressed through a
motion for summary judgment. Of course, that reading apparently is not what
the Official Revision Comment to Article 1871 had in mind when stating:
The conventional type of judgment embodies two elements: (1) an
ascertainment or declaration of the rights of the parties (usually
implied); and (2) a specific award of relief. The declaratory judgment
embodies only the first element which, of course, is always express.
Still, the idea of allowing a partial summary judgment to decide issues that
properly could be adjudicated by a declaratory judgment action has merit both
because it helps make the codal provisions compatible, and because it helps to
distinguish between issues that are and are not appropriate for resolution via
partial summary judgment.
But for the certification requirements of Article 1915, such a reading would
create the "intolerable problems of multiple appeals and piecemeal litigation"
referred to in Subaru.68 Therefore, it is of paramount importance that a trial
court judge fully understand and carefully perform the role of "dispatcher,"' 169
rather than routinely certifying partial judgments.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Act 483 of 1997 amended both our codal provisions on summary judgment
and partial judgment. The 1997 summary judgment amendments primarily were
designed to clarify 1996 amendments, and both sets of amendments were
designed to bring Louisiana summary judgment procedure more closely in line
with federal summary judgment procedure. We suggest that resulting changes
in our courtrooms are better viewed as adjustments to judicial attitudes toward
summary judgment procedure than as changes to our procedural law, and that
this area of the law needs a rest from further legislative changes to allow time
for the jurisprudence to establish some equilibrium through a process of
reexamination. This reexamination should focus on fundamentals including not
only the evidentiary burdens as explained in Celotex,' " but also the pro-
cedure's purpose and the judge's role therein. With a proper fundamental
understanding of the procedure, future jurisprudence can strike the proper balance
between preventing unnecessary trials and preserving the right to try genuine
issues of material fact.
168. Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616So. 2d 1234,1241 (La. 1993).
169. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8, 100 S. Ct. 1460, 1465
(1980).
170. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
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In contrast, legislative changes are needed in the area of partial judgments
where we have a state of confusion as to appellate delays, certification of partial
judgments, and partial summary judgments. This confusion is the result of an
imperfect union of state and federal elements, as well as an apparent broadening
of the scope of summary judgment. Elimination of this confusion will require
careful consideration, clarification, and revision of codal provisions.
To clarify the law concerning the running of appeal delays and certification
of partial judgments we recommend that the legislature amend Articles 1911,
1913, 1914, 1915, and 1974. The suggested changes below should bring
certainty to the running of appellate delays and the process of certification by
clarifying whether the list of Article 1915(A) is exclusive, by eliminating
language allowing the parties to agree that a partial judgment constitutes a "final
judgment," by requiring a signed certificate by the trial court expressly stating
why an immediate appeal under Article 1915(A) is warranted, and by harmoniz-
ing the amended articles both with each other and with the remainder of the
Code (new language in italics):
Article 1911. Final judgment; signing; appeals
Except as otherwise provided by law, every final judgment shall be
signed by the judge. For the purpose of an appeal as provided in
Article 2083, no appeal may be taken from a final judgment until the
requirement of this Article has been fulfilled. Even after signing, no
appeal may be taken from a partial judgment under Article 1915(A)
until the judgment has been certified as provided in Article 1915(B)(1).
Article 1913. Notice of judgment
A. Notice of the signing of a default judgment against a defendant on
whom citation was not served personally, or on whom citation was
served through the secretary of state, and who filed no exceptions or
answer, shall be served on the defendant by the sheriff, by either
personal or domiciliary service, or in the case of a defendant originally
served through the secretary of state, by service on the secretary of
state.
B. Except as other provided by Article 3307, in every contested case,
except in the case where the judgment rendered is signed the same day
as trial and all counsel or parties not representedby counsel are present,
notice of the signing of a final judgment therein shall be mailed by the
clerk of court of the parish where the case was tried to the counsel of
record for each party, and to each party not represented by counsel.
C. Where a partial judgment under Article 1915(A) becomes a partial
final judgment for purposes of an immediate appeal through certifica-
tion under Article 1915(B)(1), either notice of the signing ofa judgment
containing the required certificate, or notice of the separate signing of
the required certificate, as the case may be, shall be mailed by the clerk
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of court of the parish where the case is pending to the counsel of record
for each party, and to each party not represented by counsel.
D. The clerk shall file a certificate in the record showing the date on
which, and the counsel and parties to whom, notice of the signing of thejudgment or notice of the signing of the required certificate was mailed.
E. Except as otherwise provided in the first three paragraphs of this
Article, notice of the signing of a final judgment is not required.
Article 1914. Interlocutory order or judgment; notice; delay for
further action when notice required.
A. When a case has been taken under advisement by the court for the
purpose of deciding whether an interlocutory order or judgment should
be rendered, the clerk shall make an entry in the minutes of the court
of any such interlocutory order or judgment rendered thereafter,
including a partial judgment under Article 1915(A) that is not certified
pursuant to Article 1915(B)(1).
B. The clerk shall mail notice of the rendition of the interlocutory
order or judgment to the counsel of record for each party and to each
party not represented by counsel. Except as provided in the next
Paragraph, and excluding both the seekingof certification underArticle
1915(B)(1) and the seeking of supervisory writs under Article 2201,
each party shall have ten days from the date of the mailing of the notice
to take any action or file any pleadings as he deems necessary.
C. If the interlocutory order or judgment is one refusing to grant a new
trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, regardless of whether
the motion is taken under advisement, the delay for appealing com-
mences to run only from the date of the mailing of the notice, as
provided in Articles 2087 and 2123.
D. The provisions in this Article do not apply to an interlocutory
injunctive order or judgment.
Article 1915. Partial judgment.
A. A judgment that does not grant the successful party or parties all the
relief prayed for, or that does not adjudicate all of the issues in the case,
may be rendered and signed by the court, only in instances when the
court:
(1) Dismisses the suit as to less than all of the parties,
defendants, third party plaintiffs, third party defendants, or
intervenors.
(2) Grants a motion for judgment on the pleadings, as
provided by Articles 965, 968, and 969.
(3) Grants a motion for summary judgment as provided by
Articles 966 through 969, including a summary judgment
granted pursuant to Article 966(E).
1998]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
(4) Signs a judgment on either the principal or incidental
demand, when the two have been tried separately, as provided
by Article 1038.
(5) Signs a judgment on the issue of liability when that issue
has been tried separately by the court, or when, in a jury trial,
the issue of liability has been tried before a jury and the issue
of damages is to be tried before a different jury.
[Alternative language for Paragraph A.]
A. A court may render and sign a judgment that grants the successful
party or parties only part of the relief prayed for, or that adjudicates
only part of the issues on the merits.
B. (1) When a court renders a partial judgment as provided in the
preceding Paragraph, the judgment shall not constitute a final
judgment for the purpose of an immediate appeal until the court
signs a certificate expressly stating why an immediate appeal is
warranted.
(2) In the absence of such a certificate, the partialjudgment
shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties
and shall not constitute a final judgment for the purpose of an
immediate appeal. Any such order or decision issued may be
revised at any time prior to the rendition of the judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all
the parties.
C. If an appeal is taken from any judgment rendered under the
provisions of this Article, the trial court shall retain jurisdiction to
adjudicate the remaining issues in the case.
Article 1974. Delay for applying for new trial.
The delay for applying for a new trial shall be seven days,
exclusive of legal holidays. Except as otherwise provided in the next
two paragraphs hereof, this delay commences to run on the day after
the judgment was signed.
When notice of the judgment is required under Article 1913, the
delay for applying for a new trial commences to run on the day after
the clerk has mailed, or the sheriff has served, the notice of judgment
as required by Article 1913.
When notice of the signing of a certificate is required underArticle
1913(C), the delay for applying for a new trial commences to run on the
day after the clerk has mailed, or the sheriff has served, the notice of
the signing of the certificate as required by Article 1913(C).
To clarify the proper scope of partial summary judgments, we recommend
the legislature amend Article 966(E) and Article 968 to read as follows (new
language is italics):
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Article 966(E).
A summaryjudgment may decide rights, status, and other legal relations
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.
Article 968. Effect of judgment on pleadings and summary
judgment.
Judgments on the pleadings, and summary judgments, are final
judgments, except when they are partial judgments under Article
1915(A) that have not been certified under Article 1915(B), and shall be
rendered and signed in the same manner and with the same effect as if
a trial had been had upon evidence regularly adduced.
An appeal does not lie from the court's refusal to render any judgment
on the pleadings or summary judgment.
Because the suggested language gives a broad scope to partial summary
judgments, a careful and conservative approach to certification is imperative.
Our suggestions assume that the legislature will continue to follow the
federal approach and require certification for all partial adjudications under
Article 1915. As an alternative to our suggestions, the legislature could call
upon the Louisiana State Law Institute, as our official advisory law revisions
commission, law reform agency, and legal research agency,'' to formulate a
different approach. For example, a "hybrid" approach could allow immediate
appeals of partial judgments on an exclusive list, but only allow immediate
appeals of other types of partial judgments after certification. The legislature
also could opt to repeal the new provisions and reinstate the former law.
However, whether the legislature adopts our suggestions, seeks guidance from the
Louisiana State Law Institute, reinstates the former law, or takes yet another
tack, the legislature needs to take comprehensive action; mere judicial interpreta-
tion of existing provisions or piecemeallegislative "patching" of those provisions
would be a poor solution. At the same time, through necessary interpretations
of existing provisions, careful review of certification choices, and discretionary
exercise of plenary supervisory powers, our appellate courts must oversee the use
of the current provisions until our legislature can address the state we're in.
171. See La. R.S. 24:201 (1989).
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